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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
TAXATION: State Alcoholic Beverage Licensing
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
975 F.2d 1459 (10th Cir. 1992).
The Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma (the Tribe)
acquired a license to sell liquor, including beer containing 3.2% alcohol
by weight (3.2 beer), from the tribal Tobacco, Liquor and Beer Control
Commission under authority of a tribal ordinance regulating the sale
of liquor.' The 3.2 beer was sold at the Tribe's convenience store for
off-premises consumption and at the Tribe's golf course for on- and
off-premises consumption. The Oklahoma Tax Commission (Tax Commission) notified the Tribe that it was not in compliance with Oklahoma law requiring a state license to sell 3.2 beer. The Tribe did not
respond. The Tax Commission then notified the distributors who were
providing beer to the Tribe that their licenses to distribute 3.2 beer
could be canceled for distributing to an unlicensed entity such as the
Tribe. As a result, the distributors refused to supply 3.2 beer to the
Tribe.
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted
the Tribe's request for summary judgment permanently enjoining the
Tax Commission from regulating the Tribe's purchase or sale of 3.2
beer. 2 The district court noted that Oklahoma classifies 3.2 beer as a
"nonintoxicating" beverage. 3 This classification, according to the district court, precludes the Tax Commission from directly or indirectly
regulating the Tribe's purchase or sale of 3.2 beer. The Tax Commission appealed the summary judgment.
The issues before the court were whether the Tax Commission's
regulation of 3.2 beer was within Oklahoma's authority as conferred
to it by the federal government and whether Oklahoma could exercise
this authority through the Tax Commission.
1. 47 Fed. Reg. 10,643 (1982). The tribal ordinance requires that persons licensed
by the Tribe to sell liquor and beer "shall comply with the State of Oklahoma liquor
standards to the extent required by 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1982)." Id. § 1-9.09, at 10,645.
However, the tribal ordinance states that "total jurisdiction over the sale of liquor and
beer is reserved to and exercised by the [tribal] Tobacco, Liquor and Beer Control
Commission ...." Id.

2. Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, No. CIV-90-238-W (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 13, 1991).
3. See 37 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.1, 163.2(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1992).
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Federal criminal law prohibits the sale, giving away, or bartering of
"any malt, spirituous, or vinous liquor, including beer, ale, and wine,
or any ardent or intoxicating liquor of any kind whatsoever" in Indian
country.4 However, these criminal prohibitions do not apply if (1) the
transactions conform to laws of the state in which the transactions
occur, and (2) the transactions conform to an ordinance adopted by
the tribe.

5

The Tenth Circuit had previously ruled in United States v. New
Mexico 6 that section 1161 did not confer authority on the states to
impose licensing requirements on tribes for liquor sales.7 In the present
case, the Tenth Circuit expressly overturned New Mexico.' The Tenth
Circuit, citing Rice v. Rehner,9 held that states may exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with Indian tribes over the regulation of liquor transactions
on lndian lands.' 0
Tile district court distinguished Rice because Oklahoma's bifurcated
regulatory scheme classifies beverages as either "intoxicating" or "nonintoxicating." The scheme classifies 3.2 beer as "nonintoxicating." ' "
The Tenth Circuit ruled that Oklahoma's statutory classification of
3.2 beer as "nonintoxicating" has no bearing on whether Congress2
has conferred to the states the right to regulate the sale of 3.2 beer.'
The Tenth Circuit looked to research which reveals that Oklahoma's
"nonintoxicating" classification resulted from Oklahoma's effort to
statutorily define which beverages were illegal during its prohibition
years.'" The court then noted Oklahoma's strong regulatory interest
4
regarding the sale of 3.2 beer.'
The Tribe argued that since it is required to make application for
its beer license to the district court clerk, an entity lacking jurisdiction
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1988); see also id. § 1156 (prohibiting possession of
"intoxicating liquors" in Indian country). See generally FEUX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 305-08 (Rennard S. Strickland et al. eds, 1982) (discussing
history of liquor prohibition in Indian country).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1988).
6. 590 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
7. Id. at 328.
8. Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 975 F.2d 1459 (10th Cir.
1992).
9. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
10. Potawatoi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 975 F.2d at 1461 (citing
Rice, 463 U.S. at 727).
11. See 37 OLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.1, 163.2(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1992). In
1959 the Oklahoma legislature has since enacted the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act,
37 Oc.A. STAT ANN. §§ 501-599 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992). Under this act, the licensing
of "intoxicating" beverages is under the authority of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage
Laws Enforcement Commission, id. §§ 522-523, while the licensing of "nonintoxicating"
beverages remains with the Tax Commission, id. § 163.7.
12. Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 975 F.2d at 1463.64.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1464.
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over Indian tribes, Oklahoma's licensing scheme is invalid as applied
to Indian tribes.' 5 The Tenth Circuit held, however, that since Indian
tribes have no sovereign immunity from the state's regulation of liquor,
Oklahoma district courts may exercise licensing authority over Tribes
6
pursuant to title 37, section 163.11 of the Oklahoma Statutes.1
The Tribe also argued that since it is required as an Indian tribe to
maintain a federal permit, the state is precluded from requiring tribes
to obtain a state permit.' 7 The court held that 18 U.S.C § 1161, which
was enacted to eliminate the discriminatory effect of alcohol prohibition in Indian country, requires only that tribes have an ordinance
and does not preclude Oklahoma's district courts from exercising
licensing authority. 8 Precluding a state license, according to the Tenth
Circuit, would be contrary to section 1161.19
JURISDICTION: Sovereign Immunity in Federal Interpleader
Actions
Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166 (10th
Cir. 1992).
Indian Country U.S.A. (ICUSA) entered into an agreement with the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation (the Nation) to manage the Nation's bingo
hall in Tulsa. The Nation perceived a breach of the agreement and
obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the Nation's tribal
court. The TRO ousted ICUSA from the bingo hall and restrained the
Bank of Oklahoma (the Bank) from releasing funds to ICUSA. The
Bank was the location of three accounts established relating to the
bingo enterprise.
The Bank filed an interpleader action in federal district court against
ICUSA and the Nation. The tribal district court ultimately ruled in
favor of the Nation and issued a preliminary injunction against ICUSA.
ICUSA filed an interlocutory appeal of the tribal district court's
injunction and then filed a cross-claim against the Nation in federal
district court pursuant to the interpleader proceedings. ICUSA decided
not to proceed with its interlocutory appeal of the tribal district court's
decision but proceeded with its counter-claim in federal district court.
15. Id. at 1466.
16. This statute makes it unlawful to maintain or operate any place where "nonintoxicating" alcoholic beverages are sold without first securing a permit from the
district court clerk. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 725 (1983).
17. 37 OLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.11B (West 1990). Section 163.11B prohibits a

district court from issuing a permit to sell 3.2 beer "in any place, location or address,
for which there is outstanding license or permit from the United States government."

Id.
18. Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 975 F.2d at 1466.
19. Id.
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The Nation filed a motion to dismiss the interpleader and the crossclaim.
The district court held that ICUSA and the Bank must first exhaust
their tribal court remedies before proceeding in federal court.' The
distrilct court reasoned that the Nation's sovereign immunity divested
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the interpleader.2 The
Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal of the interpleader de novo.
The Bank argued that it would be denied due process if conflicting
claims to the funds were not determined in federal court. The Bank
also argued that commercial relations between banks and tribes would
be chilled if the court affirmed the dismissal.
As to the first argument, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Bank
offered no authority and subsequently dismissed the argument as
unpersuasive. 4 The Bank's second argument was summarily dismissed
as well. The Tenth Circuit held that the Bank had missed the point
of sovereign immunity and stated that it would not "second guess the
wisdom of the Nation's business decisions under the guise of judicial
review. "

The Bank also argued that the Nation should be treated as a foreign
sovereign pursuing commercial activity within the United States. The
Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that the Nation is not a
6
foreign sovereign, but a domestic dependant nation.
The Bank further argued, relying on Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,7 that the Tenth Circuit should
balance the importance of the Nation's sovereign immunity with the
national interest of protecting banks from multiple legal claims.8 The
Tenth Circuit held that the Bank's interest in interpleading funds in
federal court did not rise to the level of "overriding interest" as set
forth in Colville.9 The Tenth Circuit held that the Bank must argue

1. Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, No. 89-C-571-C (N.D. Okla. Jan.
2, 1991).
2. Id.
3. Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166, 1168-69 (10th Cir.
1992).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 25, 31 (1831)
(holding that Indian tribes are domestic dependant nations).
7. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
8. Bank of Okla., 972 F.2d at 1169. Colville holds that sovereignty is inconsistent
with national interests when tribes seek to engage in foreign relations, alienate land to
non-Indians without federal consent, and prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which
do not afford full Bill of Rights protection. Colville, 447 U.S. at 153-54.
9. Bank of Okla., 972 F.2d at 1169.
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questions of jurisdiction in tribal courts and fully exhaust remedies in
tribal court before proceeding to federal court. 10
As to ICUSA's counter-claim, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal, citing language in the agreement between ICUSA
and the Nation." The Tenth Circuit held that a waiver of sovereign
immunity must be unequivocally expressed and that the terms of the
agreement between ICUSA and the Nation were 2ambiguous and did
not constitute an unequivocally expressed waiver.'
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GAMING: Gaming Classification and Pact Requirements
Spokane Indian Tribe v. United States, 972 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1992)
The Spokane Tribe of Indians (the Tribe) operates a gaming casino
on its tribal lands. One of its games is a computerized game called
Pick Six Lotto (Pick Six). The game is played by placing money into
the Pick Six video terminal. The player then selects six numbers ranging
from I to 45 which are then displayed on the terminal. The Pick Six
computer then selects its own six numbers. Winnings are determined
by how many of the numbers selected by the player match those
selected by the computer. Pick Six terminals are linked together so
that players share in a single jack pot. Winnings are affected by the
number of persons playing the Pick Six terminals.
The Tribe began negotiating with the state of Washington to enter
into a tribal-state compact pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA).1 Negotiations broke down when the state insisted that
Pick Six was included in the games classified as Class III gaming
10. Id. at 1170.
11. Id. at 1171. The following clauses were part of the agreement between ICUSA
and the Nation:
3. JURISDICTION
If a court action is brought by either party to obtain a declaration of
rights or duties under this Agreement, it is agreed that such action shall
be brought in the Court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation....
5. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Tribe agrees to be subject to suit by the Manager to declare rights and
duties under this Agreement ....
Id.
12. Id.; see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (holding that
a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed).
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
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devices. 2 The dispute was submitted to the United States Attorney's
Office for the Eastern District of Washington which determined that
Pick Six was a Class III gaming device. The Tribe and the federal
government agreed to have the dispute settled via the Declaratory
Judgement Act 3 in federal district court. 4 The district court ruled that

Pick Six was a Class III gaming device subject to tribal-state compact
requirements. 5
The Tribe argued that Pick Six is a Class II gaming device and
should be exempt from the tribal-state compact requirements. The
Ninth Circuit held that a Pick Six machine is less like bingo and more
like an electronic facsimile in which a single participant plays against
a computer. 6 The Ninth Circuit also noted language in the Congressional Record which reveals
Congress' intent to distinguish between
'7
"lotto" and "lottery."
2. The IGRA defines class II gaming, in relevant part, as follows:
(i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo (whether or not electronic, computer, or other technologic aids are used in connection there-

with)

(I) which is played for prizes, including monetary prizes, with
cards bearing numbers or other designations,
(II)in which the holder of the card covers such numbers or
designations when objects, similarly numbered or designated,
are drawn or electronically determined, and
(III) in which the game is won by the first person covering
a previously designated arrangement of numbers or designations on such cards, including (if played in the same
location) pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant
bingo, and other games similar to bingo...
Id. § 2703(7)(A). The definition of Class IIgaming specifically excludes any "electronic
or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or slot machines of any kind."
Id. § 2703(7)(B)(ii).
3. Id. §§ 2201-2202.
.4.
Spokane Indian Tribe v. United States, 972 F.2d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1992).
5. Spokane Indian Tribe v. United States, No. CV-90-00388-RJM (E.D. Wash.
Apr. 11, 1991).
6. Spokane Indian Tribe v. United States, 972 F.2d at 1093.
7. Sen. Peter Domenici (R.-N.M.) made the following comment on September 15,
1988, during floor discussion of amendments to the IGRA:
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for including an amendment to clarify
that lotto games are played only at the same location as bingo games
which are class II games under the bill. I believe there are other Senators
who have questioned whether lotto and lotteries are interchangeable terms.
This amendment makes it clear that they are not and that traditional type
lottery games are indeed class III. As such, lotteries may only be conducted
by a tribe if such games are otherwise legal in the State and if the tribe
and the state have reached a compact to regulate such games.
134 CoNo. Rac. 12650 (1988) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (emphasis added); see also
Oneidat Tribe v. Wisconsin, 951 F.2d 757, 760-62 (1991) (holding that "lotto" unambiguously means a game of chance, played in a bingo-like setting on a bingo-like card,
following bingo-like procedures).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/7
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The Ninth Circuit concluded that the legislative history of the IGRA
demonstrates that Congress intended lotteries and number games such
as Pick Six to meet the tribal-state compact requirements as set forth
in the IGRA. 8
TREATIES: Interpretation of Reservation Boundaries
Lummi Indian Tribe v. Washington, 969 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1992).
This case arose out of a magistrate's effort to allocate fishing rights
in the waters of Bellingham Bay in the state of Washington. At issue
was the location of the eastern boundary of the Lummi reservation
which was created under the 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott.' The state
relied on language in an Executive Order of 1873 which defined the2
eastern border as running along the low water line of the bay.
According to the Lummi, Governor Stevens in 1855 represented to
them that the eastern border is a straight line from Point Francis to
Treaty Rock. The Lummi also claim that the language of the 1837
Executive Order is ambiguous and that any ambiguities in Indian
treaties should be interpreted in favor of the Indians. The magistrate
ruled in favor of the State. The United States and the Lummi objected
8. Spokane Indian Tribe v. United States, 972 F.2d at 1094-95.
1. The Treaty of Point Elliott is part if the Stevens treaties, which established the

rights of certain Pacific Northwest Indians to take fish. The treaties were negotiated by
Isaac Stevens, the Governor of Washington Territory and Superintendent of Indian

Affairs, between the United States and the Indians in the 1850s. Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 666-69, 674-79

(1979).
2. The handwritten version of the Executive Order reads:
Executive Mansion
November 22 1873
It is hereby ordered that the following tract of country in Washington

Territory be withdrawn from sale and set apart for the use and occupation
of the Dwamish and other allied tribes of Indians, viz:
Commencing at the eastern mouth of Lummi River thence up said river
to the point where it is intersected by the line between sections seven and
eight of township thirty eight north range two east of the Willamette
meridian thence due north on said section line to the township line between
townships thirty eight and thirty nine thence west along said township line
to the low water mark on the shore of the Gulf of Georgia thence southerly
and easterly along the said shore with the meanders thereof across the
western mouth of Lummi River and around Point Francis thence northeasterly to the place of beginning - so much thereof as lies south of the
West Fork of the Lummi River being a part of the island already set apart
by the second article of the treaty with the Dwamish and other allied tribes
of Indians made and concluded January 22, 1857 [sic].
Exec. Order of Nov. 22, 1873, reprinted in United States v. Romaine, 255 F. 253, 25354 (9th Cir. 1919).
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to the magistrate's finding in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington. The district court found that the 1873
Executive Order was ambiguous in its description of the eastern boundary but ruled in favor of the State. 3
The Ninth Circuit held that treaties with Indians must be interpreted
as the Indians would have understood them, with any ambiguities
being resolved in favor of the Indians. 4 However, the Ninth Circuit,
reviewing de novo the interpretation and application of the treaty,
determined that the Executive Order was unambiguous in its description
of the eastern boundary of the Lummi reservation.3
In United States v. Romaine,6 the Ninth Circuit had to determine
the "point of beginning" referred to in the 1873 Executive Order. The
Romaine court accepted testimony of several Lummi Indians, including
100-year-old George Tsilano, who was thirty-eight at the time of the
1855 treaty. Tsilano testified that the eastern boundary was represented
to them as a straight line from Point Francis to Treaty Rock. 7 In fact,
the Romaine court found the testimony of the Lummi Indians to be
uncontradicted, unimpeached, and sustained as it is by the
hydrographic maps which the court below, erroneously as
we think, discredited, together with the proof of the general
understanding of the Indians that the treaty fixed the eastern
line of their reservation on a line running from Point Francis
to Treaty Rock .... 1
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Romaine decision determined only
the "point of beginning" and the rights to tidelands along a portion
of the eastern boundary and is not, therefore, precedent for determining the nature of the entire eastern boundary. 9
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in holding that the Executive
Order of 1873 was unambiguous, fixing the boundary of the Lummi
reservation to be the low-water mark from along the coast of Georgia
easterly and then northeasterly from Point Francis to Treaty Rock,
3. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Washington, No. 9213-Phase I (W.D. Wash. May 30,
1990) ("The fact that the legal description in the executive order is ambigious [sic] does

not ipso facto entitle the Lummis to the most favorable conceivable interpretation when
all or the other evidence strongly supports the selection of the low water mark as the
eastern boundary.").
4. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Washington, 969 F.2d 752, 755 (1992); see Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970) (holding that any doubtful expressions

in Indian treaties should be'resolved in the Indians' favor).
5. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Washington, 969 F.2d at 755-56.
6. 255 F. 253 (9th Cir. 1919).

7. Id. at 256.
8. Id. at 259.
9. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Washington, 969 F.2d at 757.
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affirmed the district court ruling in favor of the state of Washington. 10
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
TAXATION: Automobile Sales for On-Reservation Use
Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, 964 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir. 1992).
The state of Louisiana charges a sales tax on the retail sale of motor
vehicles within the state.' The Tunica-Biloxi Tribe (the Tribe) purchased
a van off-reservation for the exclusive use of the tribal health department. The van was placed on the reservation and has been permanently
garaged there since the retail sale. After the state sought payment of
the sales tax, the Tribe paid "under protest." '2 The Tribe and individuals brought suit against the state and state officers. The individual
plaintiffs attempted to certify as a class Indians who own vehicles
which are purchased and then taken to a reservation and garaged. The
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the tax was invalid, a refund of
the sales tax they paid, and an injunction compelling the state to
refund sales tax payments to similarly situated persons and/or organizations that had paid the tax within the last three years. The district
court dismissed the individual-capacity suits, refused to certify the
class, held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the individual
claims under the Tax Injunction Act, 3 and awarded summary judgment
4
in favor of the state.

The Fifth Circuit assumed jurisdiction over the Tribe's appeal, noting
that the Tax Injunction Act does not preclude federal jurisdiction over
a Tribe's challenge to state taxation.5 The Fifth Circuit, citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,6 also noted that a state may tax lands,
activities, and property "within the boundaries of the reservation"
only where there has been a "cession of jurisdiction or other federal
10. Id. at *9.
1. LA. Rav. STAT. § 47:302(A) (West 1990). Section 47:302(A) provides as follows:
"There is hereby levied a tax upon the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the
distribution, and the storage for use or consumption in this state, of each item or article
of tangible personal property ... ." Id.

2. The Tribe states that it paid "under protest" by including a letter with the

payment. It does not appear that the Tribe availed itself of the state's statutory protest
system. See id. §§ 47:1401-:1486 (West 1990).
3.
4.
5.
6.

28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, No. CA-89-596-A (M.D. La. Apr. 22, 1991).
Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, 964 F.2d 1536, 1538 (5th Cir. 1992).
411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
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statutes permitting. ' 7 This rule, according to the Fifth Circuit, yields
two presumptions: (1) state taxation of on-reservation tribal activities
is invalid, and (2) state taxation of off-reservation tribal activities is
valid.s
The Tribe argued that the taxation of motor vehicles for on-reservation use falls under the on-reservation presumption claiming that
the taxable event occurred when the tribe took the vehicle to and
garaged it on the reservation. The Tribe relied on Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation,9 Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,10 and Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue."
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Moe in that it invalidated a law
taxing the ownership of a motor vehicle on an Indian reservation. The
court noted that Colville invalidated a tax which taxed the use of a
motor vehicle within the state. Finally, the Fifth Circuit distinguished
Ramah, noting that it had invalidated a tax which essentially compen2
sated the state for the privilege of doing business within the state.
The Fifth Circuit held that the taxable event was the retail sale of
the motor vehicle and not its use, possession, ownership or storage on
an Indian reservation. 3 Accordingly, the tax falls within
the off4
reservation presumption and is presumptively a valid tax.
The Tribe argued that since the vehicle was used exclusively by the
tribal health department, the purchase of the vehicle should be exempt
from state sales tax. The Tribe, relying on language in Ramah, contended that federal regulation of Indian health care is so pervasive
that it has left no room for the additional burden of a state sales tax.
The Fifth Circuit found the argument superficially attractive but,
nonetheless, flawed. The Fifth Circuit reiterated that the Ramah decision invalidated the taxation of on-reservation activity; namely, the
construction of a school on an Indian reservation. The Fifth Circuit
noted that the sale of the vehicle, which occurred off reservation, was
the taxed event. Therefore, the sales tax was valid."
7. Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, 964 F.2d at 1538.
8. Id.
9. 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (holding that an annual personal property tax on reservation
automobiles is invalid).
10. 447 U.S. 134, 163 (1980) (declaring invalid an excise tax on motor vehicles for
the privilege of using such vehicles within the state).
11. 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (invalidating a state 's gross receipts tax for work performed
by a non-Indian contractor on an Indian reservation).
12. The Ramah court held that the privilege of doing business on an Indian
reservation is exclusively bestowed by the Federal Government. Ramah, 458 U.S. at
844.
13. Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, 964 F.2d 1536, 1540 (5th Cir. 1992).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1542.
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COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: Partially Unrestricted Lands
Cravatt v. Oklahoma, 825 P.2d 277 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
Cravatt, an Indian, was convicted of the murder of a non-Indian
on land that had an undivided one-seventh restricted allotment interest
and five-seventh's undivided restricted interest by deed. The remaining
one-seventh undivided interest was unrestricted. The murder defendant,
an Indian, raised the question of jurisdiction via the Major Crimes
Act,' claiming that the situs of the murder was in Indian Country,
divesting the state of criminal jurisdiction.
The State, relying on California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,2 argued that the court should find that an "exceptional circumstance" exists allowing the State to assume jurisdiction.' The exceptional
circumstance, according to the State, was the mixed title of the land;
the one-seventh undivided unrestricted interest would technically fall
within state jurisdiction. The court held that Cabazon does not apply
and that the state has, at most, jurisdiction over the one-seventh
undivided interest in the property.4 The Court of Criminal Appeals
noted that it was expressing no opinion as to whether a greater degree
of unrestricted ownership would yield state criminal jurisdiction.'
Holding that the state lacked jurisdiction over the crime of murder
by an Indian in Indian country, the Court of Criminal Appeals vacated
the murder conviction and remanded with an order to dismiss the7
charge. The conviction for a related charge of larceny was affirmed.

1. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1988).
2. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
3. In Cabazon the Supreme Court held that under "exceptional circumstances,"

and "in the absence of express congressional consent," a state may assume jurisdiction
"over the on-reservation activities of tribal members." Id. at 214-18.
4. Cravatt v. Oklahoma, 825 P.2d 277, 280 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).

5. Id.
6.Id.
7. Larceny is not a crime enumerated under the provisions of the Major Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1988), as falling under exclusive federal jurisdiction.
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